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 
ABSTRACT 
Intelligence is one of the most important aspects in the 
development of our future communities. Ranging from smart 
home, smart building, to smart city, all these smart 
infrastructures must be supported by intelligent power supply. 
Smart grid is proposed to solve all challenges of future electricity 
supply. In smart grid, in order to realize optimal scheduling, a 
Smart Meter (SM) is installed at each home to collect the near 
real-time electricity consumption data, which can be used by the 
utilities to offer better smart home services. However, the near 
real-time data may disclose user’s privacy. An adversary may 
track the application usage patterns by analyzing the user’s 
electricity consumption profile. In this paper, we propose a 
privacy-preserving and efficient data aggregation scheme. We 
divide users into different groups and each group has a private 
blockchain to record its members’ data. To preserve the inner 
privacy within a group, we use pseudonym to hide user’s identity, 
and each user may create multiple pseudonyms and associate 
his/her data with different pseudonyms. In addition, the bloom 
filter is adopted for fast authentication. The analysis shows that 
the proposed scheme can meet the security requirements, and 
achieve a better performance than other popular methods. 
 
Index Terms—Smart communities; privacy-preserving; smart 
grid; blockchain; pseudonym; bloom filter. 
 INTRODUCTION 
mart communities have many typical examples, such as 
smart home, smart building, and smart campus. Smart 
communities are built on top of smart power supply with 
smart grid. For instance, the implementation of smart home is 
very dependent on the Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
(AMI), which is one of the key technologies of smart grid. In 
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AMI, two-way communication between the utility and the 
customers is achieved with the support of information and 
communication technologies. Smart meters (SM) are widely 
deployed to provide electric utilities with reliable power 
services. In order to realize optimal scheduling, large 
quantities of SMs have been installed in users’ homes to 
collect near real-time electricity consumption data on a 
requested or scheduled basis [1]. Based on the data collected, 
the control center can draw the electricity consumption profile 
and then offer the dynamic pricing which allows users to 
benefit from by altering their electricity consumption 
behaviors. For example, some users will adjust their electricity 
consumption behaviors if they are aware of the high cost of 
electricity at peak demand times. Besides, a power plan can be 
developed in advance according to the total electricity 
consumption requests. 
However, the near real-time electricity consumption data 
and the power consumption requests collected by SM may 
disclose user’s privacy. With non-intrusive appliance load 
monitors (NALM), the adversary could track the application 
consumption patterns to infer user’s behaviors, e.g., by 
analyzing the user’s electricity consumption profile, which is a 
non-negligible threat to the user privacy. Besides, the power 
consumption requests used for developing the power plan may 
disclose user’s activity plan in future.  For example, a thief 
may find out when the user will not be at home from the power 
request, and commit theft by that time. 
Although there have been many works contributing to the 
privacy preservation in smart grid, several challenges remain 
to be addressed.  The first challenge is the availability of a trust 
party for data aggregation. Privacy is the most important 
concern when users submitting their sensitive data to a third 
party.  In practice, it could be difficult to find an aggregator 
that is trusted by all users. The second challenge is to hide the 
connection between a user’s real identity and the pseudonym. 
Pseudonym is a common solution to disguise user’s identity. 
However, the connection between user’s real identity and the 
pseudonym may be disclosed by matching the electricity 
consumption profile with user behaviors in a particular period 
of time.  The third   challenge is the authentication speed. As 
smart grid is a huge and complex system, conventional 
authentication mechanisms may not fit for smart grid 
considering the huge amount of computational overheads and 
time delays. 
To tackle the above-mentioned challenges, we propose the 
following solutions.  In lack of a trusted third party for data 
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aggregation, one user is chosen randomly in each time slot to 
aggregate all users’ data and record these data into the 
blockchain for message integrity. Since the blockchain is 
shared by all users in the same group, even if a malicious user 
is selected as the aggregator who tampers the record, the 
tampered data will be found by the others. To hide the 
connection between the user identity and pseudonym, we 
allow each user to create multiple pseudonyms and submit 
their electricity consumption data under different pseudonyms. 
To realize fast authentication while protecting user’s privacy, 
we use bloom filter to judge the validity of pseudonyms and 
check the existence of fake pseudonym base on zero 
knowledge proof.  
In this paper, we first introduce the related 
privacy-preserving techniques. Then, we give the 
preliminaries of our scheme design. Next, the proposed 
scheme is described in detail. After that, we conduct the 
security analysis and performance evaluation. At last, we 
conclude our paper. 
EXISTING PRIVACY-PRESERVING TECHNIQUES 
Recently, various techniques have been proposed to address 
the problem of privacy preserving in smart grid. Reading 
through the related work, we summarize the related techniques 
from two aspects. One aspect focuses on protecting user’s 
identity and the other aspect places emphasis on protecting 
user’s data. 
A. Protecting user’s identity 
 Privacy-preserving based on virtual ring 
A scheme based on virtual ring to protect user’s identity is 
proposed in [2]. Users send their messages to the control 
center through the virtual ring, and the control center validates 
user’s identity through ring signature without knowing the 
user’s identity. The disadvantage of this kind of schemes is 
that if there is a malicious user sending falsified messages 
through the virtual ring, it is difficult to find out who the 
malicious user is because of the property of virtual ring. 
 Privacy-preserving techniques based on anonymity 
Anonymization [3] [4] is a common technique to protect 
user’s identity. User’s attributes can be classified into identity 
information, quasi-identifier and sensitive information. For an 
anonymity table, if the attributes have not been anonymized, 
the adversary may infer the relationship between the user’s 
identity and the sensitive information by observing the 
quasi-identifiers such as age and gender. The limitation is that 
there must exist a reliable third party dedicated for processing 
the user’s attributes. In our scheme, blockchain is adopted to 
achieve decentralized data processing. 
 Privacy-preserving based on pseudonym 
Pseudonym [5] is also a popular technique to protect user’s 
identity.  The registration process of pseudonym often 
involves ring signature, zero knowledge proof and so on. Gong 
et al. [6] propose a privacy-preserving scheme for 
incentive-based demand response in the smart grid, which 
adopts the discrete logarithm to create the pseudonym and 
hides the user identity through ring signature during the 
registration process of pseudonym. To hide this relationship, 
in our scheme, each user is allowed to adopt multiple 
pseudonyms during data collection. 
B. Protecting user’s data 
 Privacy-preserving based on household battery 
A scheme using the battery to hide the near real-time data is 
proposed in [7] [8]. When the household consumption profile 
goes high, the battery discharges. Otherwise, it charges. 
Therefore, user’s electricity consumption profile can be 
balanced by the house battery and the user’s privacy can be 
protected very well. However, the disadvantage of this kind of 
scheme is that using battery to hide user’s electricity 
consumption profile may conflict with user’s economic 
interest, especially battery charging at the peak times. Besides, 
the effect of privacy preserving depends on the capacity of 
battery. The tradeoff between privacy and economic cost is 
analyzed in [9]. 
 Privacy-preserving based on data aggregation 
Data aggregation is a common scheme to protect user’s data 
and it contains homomorphic encryption and data obfuscation. 
The homomorphic encryption allows the intermediary agent to 
operate on the encrypted data with no information about the 
plaintext. Paillier encryption and BGN encryption are two 
typical homomorphic encryption methods, and are often used 
to calculate the sum of electricity consumption data based on 
the property of additive homomorphism. The main idea of data 
obfuscation is to add noise into the original data to obfuscate 
user’s electricity consumption data. Based on the noise being 
added, it is divided into two categories: random data 
obfuscation [10] and non-random data obfuscation [11]. In the 
former category, the noise is completely random. In the latter 
category, each user’s noise is usually assigned by the key 
management center to ensure that the summation of noise is 
equal to zero. 
 Privacy-preserving authentication techniques  
Privacy preserving and authentication are two related topics 
[12] [13]. Cheung et al. [14] propose a credential-based 
privacy-preserving scheme based on the blind signature. A 
consumer generates lots of credentials and asks the control 
center to sign these credentials blindly. The credentials will be 
sent to the control center for proof of user’s identity when the 
user asks for more power. However, the computational 
overhead of this scheme is heavy since the control center need 
to sign numerous credentials each month. 
PRELIMINARIES 
A. Blockchain  
Blockchain is a chronologically ordered chain of blocks 
which can be considered as a replicated state machine. For 
each block, the transactions are hashed in Merkle Tree. The 
root hash of Merkle Tree and the hash of previous block are 
recorded in the block header. As the blocks are connected by 
the hash of the previous block, anyone who wants to change 
the backdated transactions has to modify that block and all the 
following blocks, which is considered difficult. 
To generate a valid block, Proof-of-Work, a puzzle that is 
difficult to solve but easy to verify, is adopted to select a 
suitable user as the mining node. Then, the mining node 
broadcasts the completed block and the other nodes can check 
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the validity of the new block based on the Proof-of-Work. 
However, Proof-of-Work usually needs to spend huge amount 
of computational cost. For instance, in Bitcoin, to generate a 
valid block, mining node must keep on trying different random 
number until the hash of the block conforms to the regulations. 
As the utility terminal devices only support lightweight 
operations, we design a simple solution to randomly select the 
mining node. The user whose data is the closest to the average 
electricity consumption data in a time slot will be selected as 
the mining node. Because no one can confirm the value of 
average electricity consumption data before receiving all the 
users’ data, the randomness and uniqueness of the selection of 
mining node can be guaranteed. 
B. Bloom Filter 
Bloom filter is a fast query algorithm that can be used for 
fast authentication. It can quickly confirm whether an ID is 
legal in the system. The authentication process can be divided 
into two stages. 
 Initialization of bloom filter 
For an array of   elements, we initially set each element to 
be zero. Given an ID, we choose k hash functions to calculate k 
hash values of this ID as the index values and set the mapping 
values of the corresponding positions in the array to be one. 
The index value in the array is calculated as ( ) mod .ih ID   Note that the mapping value will not increase if multiple hash 
values refer to the same position.  
 Authentication by bloom filter 
To authenticate the validity of an ID, we can calculate k 
hash values of the ID with the k hash functions to obtain the 
index values. 
If the mapping values of the ID satisfy that each of the index 
value is equal to ( )modih ID   and contains zero in the bloom 
filter, this ID is illegal. As shown in Fig.1, 1ID  and 2ID  come 
from two valid users. 3ID  is fabricated by an adversary. By 
using the bloom filter, the illegal 3ID  can be detected easily 
based on the fact that the mapping values of 3ID  contains 
zero. 
1ID
1 1( )modh ID  2 1( )modh ID 
2ID
1 2( )modh ID  2 2( )modh ID 
-1
3ID
 
Figure.1 Bloom filter 
C. Zero knowledge proof  
Zero knowledge proof means that the verifier can prove the 
correctness of the input but has no information about the 
content of the input. 
In this paper, we take user’s pseudonym as our example. 
pk and sk represent a user’s public and private key, 
respectively. We consider the public key pk  as a user’s 
pseudonym and no one knows this user’s real identity. Then, 
the user sends ( | )skEK m pk to the verifier. Here, ( | )skEK m pk  
represents the concatenation of message m and pseudonym 
pk  encrypted by the private key sk . The verifier can confirm 
if the user’s pseudonym is real by decrypting ( | )skEK m pk  
with the user’s public key, but have no information about the 
user’s real identity. 
PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA AGGREGATION SCHEME 
A. System model 
As shown in Fig.2, the system model is a multi-tier smart 
grid communication network that consists of neighborhood 
area networks (NAN) and wide area networks (WAN). The 
NAN is formed by a large number of smart meters (SM) in the 
neighborhood.  SMs send their meter readings to the mining 
node for data aggregation. The aggregated data of each group 
are sent to the center unit through the WAN.  
We divide users into different groups according to their 
electricity consumption type. In each time slot, a user is chosen 
as the mining node according to the average electricity 
consumption data. The mining node is responsible for 
aggregating the data and recording these data into the private 
blockchain. 
Key management center (KMC) is mainly responsible for 
initializing all of the keys for users. It generates multiple public 
and private keys for each user and takes the public key as the 
user’s pseudonym. Then, it creates a bloom filter for each 
group by collecting the pseudonyms and sends the bloom filter 
to all users in the corresponding group. 
The aggregated data of each group will be sent to the center 
unit through the wide area network. The control center can 
draw the electricity consumption profile based on the 
aggregated near real-time data for power planning and 
dynamic pricing.  
The billing center is responsible for calculating each user’s 
billing data based on the blockchain of each group when the 
billing date comes.  
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Figure.2 System model 
B. System initialization 
Fig.3 shows the architecture of our scheme in detail. KMC 
is responsible for bootstrapping the whole system in the 
beginning. Specifically, it executes the following procedures 
for system initialization 
 Key generation 
RSA algorithm: KMC chooses two large primes p, q, and 
calculates n pq . Then, it chooses an integer e which satisfies
1 ( )e n  . Here, ( )n  denotes the Euler function and the 
great common divisor of e and ( )n is equal to one. Next, 
KMC calculates a parameter d which satisfies 1(mod )de n . e 
represents the private key and d represents the public key. 
Each user sends his ID to KMC for registration and acquires 
the public and private keys by running the RSA algorithm. 
Note that each user can acquire multiple pairs of public and 
private keys and takes the public keys as their pseudonyms. 
 Bloom filter 
Users are divided into different groups according to their 
electricity consumption types. Then, KMC creates the bloom 
filter for each group.  
First, KMC sets an array which has  bits. Then, it uses k 
hash functions to calculate the hash values of all the 
pseudonyms in the same group. The mapping value whose 
index value is equal to ( ) modih pk   is set to one. At last, 
KMC sends the bloom filter to all the users in the same group.  
C. Data collection 
To hide the identity from other users in the same group, we 
use pseudonyms to replace the user’s true identity and each 
user can bind his electricity consumption data with multiple 
pseudonyms to achieve further obfuscation.  
 Data allocation 
In each time slot, such as 15min, each user randomly splits 
his/her electricity consumption data to be associated with 
different pseudonyms and publishes his electricity 
consumption data im , pseudonym ipk and ( | | )isk i iEK m t pk  
in the group. Here, ( | | )
isk i i
EK m t pk represents the 
concatenation of im , timestamp t and pseudonym ipk , 
encrypted by the sender’s private key isk . 
It’s noteworthy that the allocated data can be negative. 
Therefore, user’s privacy-sensitive data can be protected 
during the off-peak time, such as midnight. Besides, each user 
can assign his electricity consumption data into more or less 
pseudonyms as needed. At last, the user will publish { , , , ( | | )}
ii i sk i i
m t pk EK m t pk  in the group.  
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Figure.3 The architecture of our scheme 
D. Identity-authentication 
 Authenticity of user’s pseudonym 
In case that an adversary forges legal a user’s pseudonym, 
we verify the authenticity of user pseudonyms by zero 
knowledge proof.  
When a user receives { , , , ( | | )}
ii i sk i i
m t pk EK m t pk sent by 
another user, he uses the sender’s pseudonym ipk  to check 
the signature ( | | )
isk i i
EK m t pk . If ( | | )
isk i i
EK m t pk can be 
decrypted by ipk  correctly, the pseudonym is proved to be 
authentic. 
 Validity of user’s pseudonym 
In case that an unregistered adversary constructs a 
pseudonym and sends false data to the system, bloom filter is 
used to verify the validity of user’s pseudonym.  
For each received pseudonym, the receiver will use k hash 
functions to calculate the index values of this pseudonym as
( ) modih ID  . If all the mapping values don’t contain zero, the 
pseudonym is proved to be legal. Otherwise, the pseudonym 
will be considered as illegal and dropped by the receiver. 
E. Selection of mining node 
After the identity authentication, all users will determine the 
mining node to aggregate their electricity consumption data 
and record these data into the blockchain.  
Firstly, each user calculates the average electricity 
consumption data based on all the received data. Secondly, the 
one whose data is closest to the average is selected as the 
mining node.  
There may be multiple pseudonyms whose average 
electricity consumption data have the same distance to the 
average, which means all of them will be the mining nodes in 
this time slot. However, such particular case doesn’t affect the 
generation of new block, because the new block generated by 
either mining node is the same. No one knows the average 
before collecting data from all users in the group, therefore, it 
is difficult for a malicious user to increase the probability of 
being selected as a mining node.  
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F.  Creation of new block 
The structure of a block is shown in Fig.4. After the mining 
node is selected, the electricity consumption data will be 
recorded into the blockchain and published among all users in 
this group for message authentication. 
Firstly, the electricity consumption data are hashed by the 
mining node in the Merkle Tree. Secondly, the mining node 
records the root hash, timestamp, hash of the previous block, 
pseudonym and the average into the block header. At last, the 
new block will be published to the other users in the group for 
the message authentication. 
 
Figure.4 The structure of block in our scheme 
G. verification of the block 
After receiving the new block, each user starts to verify the 
authenticity of the records. If the records in the new block are 
right, the user will attach this block to the blockchain which is 
saved in his dataset. If there is no one against the records in the 
new block, the mining node will send the sum of electricity 
consumption data to the control center. 
To satisfy the real-time dispatch in the smart grid, each user 
only needs to verify the records related to his/her own data and 
the verification can be carried out offline. Therefore, we can 
aggregate the near real-time data with blockchain in a 
decentralized manner. 
H. Dispatching and billing 
After receiving the sum of electricity consumption data 
from each group, the control center will draw the electricity 
consumption profile and offer the dynamic pricing to 
encourage users to adjust their electricity consumption 
behaviors. 
In each billing cycle, such as a week or a month, the private 
blockchain of each group will be sent to the billing center. 
With the dynamic pricing in different times denoted by
0 1, ,... fp p p , the billing center can calculate the electricity bill 
denoted by sumP  according to the following formula: 
0 0 1 1 ...sum f fP E p E p E p   , where 0 1, ,... fE E E denote the 
electricity consumption data in different time slots recorded in 
blockchain. As blockchain can guarantee the data integrity, we 
can realize the accurate billing easily. 
SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A. Data Privacy 
For an adversary out of the group, he/she only knows the 
sum of electricity consumption data from the mining node. 
Therefore, the individual private data will not be disclosed. 
The mining node is chosen according to the average electricity 
consumption data in each time slot no one can guess the 
accurate average before the entire users’ data in the group are 
collected. Therefore, even if an insider adversary exists, 
his/her chance of becoming the mining node is no larger than 
other users. Besides, we use blockchain to record user’s data 
and the new block generated by the mining node will be 
verified by all the users in the group.  
B. Authentication 
The authentication problem can be divided into two aspects 
in our scheme. One is to verify the authenticity of user’s 
pseudonym in case that an adversary forges the legal user’s 
pseudonym. The other one is to check the validity of user’s 
pseudonym in case that an unregistered adversary sends false 
data to the control center. 
For the authenticity of user’s pseudonym, we take the public 
key as the pseudonym and use the asymmetric encryption to 
provide the zero knowledge proof. If an adversary tries to 
forge a legal user’s pseudonym, he will fail due to the lack of 
the private key. 
For the validity of user’s pseudonym, we use bloom filter to 
quickly check whether the user’s pseudonym has been 
registered. If an adversary tries to construct a pseudonym 
without registering at KMC, he will fail since the mapping 
values in bloom filter contain at least one zero. 
In fact, bloom filter has error probability. As hash collision 
may happen during the hashing operation, an unregistered 
adversary may construct a pseudonym to pass through the 
bloom filter, which means all the mapping values in the bloom 
filter equal to one. However, the probability of hash collision 
is extremely low and the error probability is related to the 
amount of users, the number of hash functions and the length 
of the bloom filter. Therefore, if we set the array size 
sufficiently large, the probability of hash collision will 
decrease and the error probability can be ignored. 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
We evaluate our scheme in time complexity by comparing 
with the conventional authentication scheme that does not 
adopt the bloom filter. Here, we set the error probability of the 
bloom filter as 0.01, suppose that the amount of users in a 
group ranges from 0 to 200.  
As shown in Fig.5, the time complexity of our scheme is 
much lower than the conventional scheme without bloom filter 
during the identity-authentication process.  
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Figure.5.The time complexity about authentication 
We compare our scheme with PPM-HAD [14] and 
DG-APED [15] in computational cost. As Fig.6 shows, our 
scheme has less computational cost than the other two 
schemes. 
 
Figure.6.The computational cost 
CONCLUSION 
We propose a privacy-preserving and efficient data 
aggregation scheme based on the blockchain to preserve user’s 
privacy in smart grid. In each time slot, we select the mining 
node based on the difference between the user’s electricity 
consumption data and the average value to guarantee the 
fairness of the selection. Then, the mining node records all 
users’ data into the blockchain and publishes the blockchain 
within the group to ensure the message integrity. To defend 
against the snoop from other users in the same group, we adopt 
pseudonyms to protect user’s identity and each user associate 
his data with multiple pseudonyms for further obfuscation. 
What’s more, bloom filter is adopted to realize the fast 
authentication. The performance evaluation shows that our 
scheme has significant advantage compared with the 
conventional authentication scheme and other popular data 
aggregation schemes in computational efficiency. In the future 
work, we will continue improving our scheme to reduce the 
computational overhead caused by the authentication 
especially during the system initialization. 
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 Figure.1. Bloom filter 
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 Figure.2. System model 
 
  
 
 
 
11
 
 Figure.3. The architecture of our scheme 
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 Figure.4. The structure of block in our scheme 
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 Figure.5. The time complexity about authentication 
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 Figure.6. The computational cost 
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